"Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences. For in order for certain sensations to be relatedd to some thing outside me, . . thus in order for me to represent them as out side one another,. . the representation of space must already be their ground. Thus the representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but this outer experience is itself first possible only through this representation" (B38).
The first premise that space is not an empirical concept seems precisely what needs to be proven. It is a conclusion, not a premise. So, too, the second premise, that in order for me to perceive something outside of myself the intuition of space must be pre-empirical. Isn't that precisely what needs to be proven? All three sentences seem to be saying the same thing in different ways. They are all assertions disguised as an argument.
Can anyone explain what Kant is up to? Is he blind to the circularity of his argument?
